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Abstract 
 
The negative role of corruption in the economies is strongly claimed in economic research. The 
fact that it undermines economic growth is beyond doubt. Still mixed evidences persist about 
how corruption reaches growth. This paper examines the effect of corruption on total factor 
productivity (TFP), also referred to as Solow residual, and assesses the impact related to the 
increase in tax rates on this effect. The motivation of this study is that volumes of research show 
that growth of output in a large extent results from growth in TFP. The results of the estimations 
unambiguously suggest that corruption, well as tax burden, has a negative effect on TFP. When 
both variables alongside with the lagged dependent variable are used for controlling TFP, the 
finding suggests that one-unit increase in corruption standard deviation is associated with a 
decrease of 0.01% in TFP, and the increase in tax burden in the same proportion leads to a 
decline in TFP of 0.13%. Furthermore, our findings highlight that, a tax rate increase would 
result an aggravation of the negative impact of corruption on TFP. These findings remain robust 
to the introduction of TFP determinant variables over alternative regressions.  
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1. Introduction 
The issue of how much of growth in output results from growth in physical and human capital is 
an essential point of Solow growth theory (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). Researches show that 
under the assumptions of constant returns to scale and competitive factor markets such an 
exercise, also referred to as growth accounting, is well possible.  
The empirical investigations by Abramovitz (1956) show that growth of factors of production 
contributes only of 10% of output growth per capita in the US during 1869–1878 and 1944–
1953. Over the time span of 1900–1949, Solow (1957) points out that the output growth per 
worker explained by capital accumulation is 12%. This is to say that both studies suggest that 
growth of output per worker is explained more than average by sources other than 
human/physical capital. This deviation between the observed output and that forecasted through 
human and physical capital is total factor productivity (TFP), also fairly referred to as “Solow 
residual”. This a priori unknown productivity, actually, would come from sources like innovation, 
or improvement in the institutional context. 
Even though the recent work suggest that the level of this residual has significantly declined, it is 
however very far from zero (Kendrick, 1961; Jorgenson, Frank, & Barbara, 1987; Abramovitz & 
David, 2000). For example, the empirical work of Baier, Dwyer, & Tamura (2006) on 143 
countries with 23 among them with 100 years time span, finds TFP to contribute about 14% of 
growth of the output per worker in average in those countries, representing strikingly 26% of 
economic growth for Southern Europe, 26% for Newly Industrialized Countries, and 34% for 
Western countries. However for Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East countries, the effect of 
TFP is found to be negative. Another noteworthy remark is that the variation in output per 
worked is more sensitive to the variation of TFP than variation in the classical factors, i.e. human 
and physical capital. Intuitively, one may presume that factors whatsoever might channel TFP to 
impact economic growth. This becomes even more likely as its correlation with TFP gets 
stronger. 
At the same time, volumes of scientific communications on corruption subject highlight its 
influence on economic growth. However, in a larger extent there is a consensus that corruption is 
negatively associated with the growth of the economy and seriously affects volume and especially 
the quality of the main factors of production.  
Mauro (1995)’s estimations give support to the negative effect of corruption on per capita GDP 
growth; but such an effect is not robust when the ratio of investment to GDP is included among 
the explanatory variables. A significant negative impact is also reported in the study of Keefer & 
Knack (1995), Mo (2001). Shleifer & Vishny (1993) also provide a thorough analysis in grasping 
detrimental implications of corruption in the economy (see also Bardhan, 1997; or Ades & Di 
Tella, 1999). Tanzi & Davoodi (1997), on the other hand, first making the assumption that the 
quality of investments may constitute an enhancing factor to productivity of capital, conclude 
that corruption affects the quality of the infrastructures, in line with Gillanders (2013). Curiously 
very few studies focus on the impact of corruption on human capital, albeit the mainstream 
pattern, again, argues for its detrimental aspects (Seka, 2013; Dridi, 2014; Bryant & Javaldi, 2016). 
The work of Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2004) analyses the direct and indirect effects of corruption on 
economic growth, and identifies by importance, investment, trade policy, schooling, and political 
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instability relating variables, as corruption transmission channels. All are found to be negatively 
associated with corruption except political instability, which in contrast stirs it up. Beyond its 
negative direct impact on growth, corruption may also indirectly impact it through the 
transmission channels (ibid., 2004).  
On the other hand, it should be also mentioned that the literature on corruption also records an 
alternative view other than that systematically claiming the pernicious effect of corrupt activities 
for the economy. However, corruption seems to be beneficial only in the presence of deficient 
governance with ineffective institutions – otherwise it overall reduces economic growth. The 
following work shed light on this issue: Leff (1964); Leys (1965); Méon & Sekkat (2005); Méndez 
& Sepúlveda (2006); Aidt, Dutta, & Sena (2008); or Kéïta & Laurila (2016a, b, c).  
Starting with Paldam  (1999)’s thought that the absence of corruption may constitute a growth 
factor, also supported in Lambsdorff (1999), the paper estimates the impact of corruption on 
TFP. Then, due attention is paid to examining the incidence of tax burden on such impact. If the 
increase of the size of the State through more public expenditure is seen as almost inherent to 
rent-seeking activities (Dzhumashev, 2014), one may also presume on the other hand that in 
best-governed countries – namely those subject to less tax evasion – tax rates may increase 
without necessarily triggering more corruption, and hence impacts further TFP. In such 
circumstances, one could even expect from fiscal revenues increases to foster TFP growth, as 
they may finance changes in production technology, allow more support for innovation, and help 
in strengthening institutional capacity of countries. In any cases, it seems important to shed some 
light on how TFP responds to tax increases.  
The paper is organized as follow: following this section, Section 2 presents the baseline model and 
data to be used, and explains the empirical method applied. Section 3 presents and discusses the 
empirical findings, while Section 4 is dedicated to conclusions and policy recommendations.  
2. Data and method 
 
2.1 Data 
The paper develops an empirical study covering a total of 90 countries worldwide, reported in 
Appendix (Table 7), for a time span of 1996–2014. To ensure the reliability of the study, countries 
to be part of the sample have been selected according to the availability of data.   
Following the discussions in the previous section, the paper focuses on Equation (1) below as the 
baseline model for the empirical analyses. The model reads: 
TFPi ,t = βCorruptioni ,t +γTaxBurdeni ,t +λΖ i ,t +ϖ i +ηt +εi ,t                       (1), 
On the left-hand side of Equation (1), TFPi ,t , symbolizes the levels of total factor productivity at 
constant purchasing power parity (PPP) rates, relative to the United States in terms of the prices 
in that period, for country i  in period t . It represents the dependent variable of the model. 
Statistics associated hereby come from Penn World Table, version 9.0. (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 
2015). On the right-hand side, TFPi ,t  is estimated, among others, against Corruptioni ,t  and 
TaxBurdeni ,t . The study uses the corruption perception index (CPI) from Transparency International to 
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capture the prevalence of corruption. However, note that as its name indicates, CPI is based on 
the perception of how widespread corruption is within the country. This is to say that such an 
assessment is likely to be biased because of its subjectivity. Since corruption is an illegal activity 
and therefore usually hidden deliberately, the statistics related to proven cases do not suffice to 
evaluate it. CPI ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for the highest-level possible of corruption 
and 10 indicates full integrity in the country. However, for ease in interpreting estimations we 
have rescaled the corruption figures so that their increase also indicates further corruption in the 
country. The rescaling method is as follow: Corruptioni ,t =11−CPIi ,t . The variable of interest 
TaxBurdeni ,t , assesses the level of fiscal burden borne by taxpayers. Its measurement includes both 
marginal tax rates and the overall level of taxation (both direct and indirect taxes) imposed by the 
government (both central and local levels) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Here, we use Fiscal freedom statistics provided from the Economic freedom index database (The 
Heritage Foundation).  
The paper hypothesizes that both relatively high level of corrupt activities and a-more-than 
optimal taxation constitute, among others, factors likely to drastically shrink the TFP of a country 
due to loss of competitiveness. β  and γ  stand for the respective coefficients of corruption and 
tax burden; they are expected to be negative ( β ≺ 0 , γ ≺ 0 ). Figures 1–3 plot the nature of the 
nexus between the variables of interest. Figure 1 suggests a strong negative correlation between 
TFP and corruption. The paper also provides for possible comparison regional graphics plotting 
this relationship (see Appendix). Figure 2 at first glance also indicates a negative relationship 
between TFP and tax burden. However, the regression line representing fitted values is practically 
horizontal, which suggests a weak correlation between both variables. Figure 3 shows a positive 
linkage of corruption and tax burden. Textbooks also argue that over-taxing may encourage 
agents to avoid paying taxes by bribing tax officials, or resorting to frauds and black-
marketeerings. Those are known to considerably foster shadow economy that leads in turn to a 
decline in public revenue, and implying in fine a less-than-optimal allocation of public resources, 
all things being equal. 
Furthermore, the modelling also includes a set of other explanatory variables. They are accounted 
by Ζ i ,t , which is their vector of variables and λ , their vector of coefficients. ϖ i  and ηt  
meanwhile capture the respective country specific effect and the relevant time effect. While εi ,t 	in 
the end, represents a random error term that takes into account the influence of all omitted 
variables in the estimation.  
Descriptive statistics relative to variables as well as sources are reported Table 1. Since our data 
have the time dimension we firstly ensure that the time series are stationary, meaning that their 
distribution neither follows any trend nor changes over time. The Fisher type unit-root test is 
applied – with the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root, i.e. nonstationarity; against 
the alternative hypothesis that at least one panel is stationary. Table 6 in Appendix reports the Chi-
squares and p-values associated to both Augmented Dickey-Fuller (AD-F) and Phillips-Perron 
(P-P) methods. In both cases, the non-stationarity hypothesis is systematically rejected.  
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Figure 1. Total factor productivity (TFP) with respect to Corruption 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Total factor productivity (TFP) with respect to Tax burden 
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Figure 3. Corruption with respect to Tax burden 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and data sources 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Sources 
- TFP (level at current PPPs, 
in million 2011 US dollars) 
0.680 0.324 0.105 2.492 Feenstra et al. (2015), 
Penn World Table 9.0 
- Inflation (price level of 
household consumption, US 
GDP in 2011=1) 
0.615 0.311 0.143 1.713 ——— 
- Openness (sum of shares of 
merchandises exports and 
imports in GDP, at current) 
-0.042 0.162 -0.846 0.588 ——— 
- Corruption (Corruption 
Perception Index) 
5.633 2.373 1.000 9.600 Transparency 
International 
- Property rights/100 (overall 
quality of legal framework) 
0.561 0.242 0.100 0.950 The Heritage 
Foundation 
- Tax burden/100 (% of tax 
revenue to GDP) 
0.703 0.145 0.298 0.999 ——— 
- Government spending 
(government consumption 
and all transfer)/100 
0.663 0.219 0.100 0.993 ——— 
- Improved sanitation/100, rural 
(facilities, % of rural 
population with access) 
0.683 0.339 0.021 1.000 World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
- Energy use/10,000 (kg of oil 
equivalent per capita) 
0.297 0.338 0.0009 2.276 ——— 
- Transport service (% of 
commercial services 
0.236 0.149 0.0007 0.880 ——— 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
2
4
6
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exports)/100 
- Electricity (Electric power 
consumption (in kWh per 
capita)/10000) 
1.030 3.786 1.030 55.578 ——— 
 
 	
2.2 Method 
To estimate Equation (1), the paper sequentially proceeds by using fixed effects estimation, Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS), and Two-Stage System Generalized Method of Moments (System 
GMM). The choice of methods to be finally used is wisely reasoned by the classical homogeneity 
tests for panel data. Firstly, a Fisher type test for poolability is used, which unequivocally rejects the 
null hypothesis of pool data structure against the existence of fixed effects as alternative 
hypothesis – implying that countries in the sample exhibit distinctive features. Thus, the OLS 
estimators are not appropriate. Secondly, the paper performs the Hausman test to check whether 
those individual effects are random (H0) or fixed (H1). Again, the alternative hypothesis clearly 
prevails, saying that the estimations using the fixed effects estimators best fit the data. The 
Breush-Pagan test for individual and time effects, thirdly, confirms the previous results as it tests 
the pooled estimation (H0) against the random effects model (H1). Again, the hypothesis based 
on pooled estimations is clearly rejected. The outputs of those endogeneity tests therefore 
suggest the use of the fixed effects model estimators, which are more consistent with our data.  
Our empirical analyses of Equation 1 commence with the preliminary estimations. They results are 
summarized through Regression 1 to 3 in Table 2. TFP is solely estimated with respect to 
corruption, except Regression 3 that includes in addition the lagged dependent variable. Besides, in 
line with Isaksson (2007), several additional explanatory variables are used for controlling TFP 
(Regressions 4 to 6 in Table 2 and Regression 7 to 12 in Table 3). With these regressions, it could be 
seen how robust and relevant is the initially measured impact of corruption on TFP in the 
preliminary estimations. On the other hand, one can also appraise the influence of TFP’s 
determinant variables in the estimations. The estimation method is System GMM. Table 4 
includes regressions (Regression 13 to 18) attempting to take into account the influence of a 
relatively strong tax burden on TFP. These estimations include occasionally interaction variables 
generated between corruption and tax burden (denoted Corruption*Tax burden). They aim to 
capture both variables’ indirect effect on the dependent variable. Likewise, the estimation 
technique is System GMM.  
The use of 2SLS and System GMM methods is justified by the fact that their estimators are more 
qualified in controlling for joint endogeneity problem within regressors. In particular, the System 
GMM proposed by Blundell & Bond (1998) provides consistent estimators fulfilling the 
orthogonality conditions while allowing rigorous control over the instruments. In line with 
previous empirical work on corruption, we use country data relative to geographic latitude 
(Delavallade, 2006; or Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002), ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
(Mauro, 1995), initial income of corruption (Gupta et al., 2002), and protestant as percentage of 
population (Treisman, 2000) as instruments. 
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3. Empirical results 
3.1 Preliminary estimations and estimated effects of TFP’s determinants 
Preliminary findings from Table 2 suggest that corruption has a negative influence on TFP. The 
estimated coefficients remain both negative and statistically very significant with all the three 
estimation methods. This corroborates the first suspicions revealed with Figure 1. In Regression 1, 
using fixed effects estimators, the estimation suggests that a one-unit increase in corruption 
would reduce TFP by 0.02%, all things being equal. The R-squared measuring the general quality 
of the model is very low, meaning that there are other important explanatory variables in 
explaining TFP that are missing. Regression 3 predicts a smaller negative effect of 0.005% when 
corruption increases in the same proportions. The Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, 
with the null hypothesis that instruments are not correlated with the residuals, is robust to 
autocorrelation (p-value>0.05). The Arrelano–Bond tests for first (AR (1)) and second (AR (2)) 
order correlation in the first and second differenced residuals also turns out to be conclusive. The 
null hypothesis of the AR (1) and AR (2) is that the residual from the estimations is first-order, 
but not second-order correlated. The observed p-values for the test respectively equal 0.025 
(<0.05) and 0.387 (>0.05). 
Likewise, when one considers estimations including more explanatory variables (Regression 4 in 
Table 2), the findings also confirm that corruption constitutes a serious impediment to economic 
dynamism. The estimated coefficients of corruption are all negative while showing the best 
statistical significance standard. For instance, over the nine regressions carried out, it can be seen 
that the predicted drop in TFP is 0.01 % when corruption practices are increasing by one-unit. 
There results corroborate the preliminary estimations. Furthermore, the different Sargan tests 
argue for the validity of the instruments used. The Arellano–Bond and Wald tests are also all 
robust displaying their hoped p-values. 
Concerning the other explanatory variables, the results overall seem consistent with textbook 
findings. Following their logic, we used variables related to tariff/non-tariff barriers, imports and 
openness in regressions in order to capture the “Creation-transmission and absorption of 
knowledge” dimension as TFP determinant. They all displayed positive and significant influence 
on TFP. Openness has been used as benchmark for this dimension as it presents the most 
satisfactory results. Its estimated coefficients stay positive and always significant throughout the 
estimations. In addition, it also has the advantage of being able to capture integration and 
competition as factors that may strongly encourage TFP growth (Maddison, 1999; 1997; Frankel 
& Romer, 1999).  
Using Improved sanitation facilities access as percentage of rural population as proxy for health 
variable, our results clearly confirm the alleged positive relationship between health and TFP. 
Alternatively, we also introduce Improved sanitation facilities access as percentage of urban 
population and health expenditures as percentage of GDP in regressions. The estimated 
coefficients of the proxy overall has a positive impact on the dependent variable, however 
findings were not always as relevant as they are with our benchmark health variable. The Cole & 
Neumayer (2003) empirical study on 52 developing countries over 1965–1996 also finds a 
negative correlation between the proportion of undernourished and the workforce. Furthermore, 
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the incidence of malaria and other waterborne diseases are also found to negatively affect both 
human capital and labour productivity.  
In order to account for the institutional dimension, another highly influential factor for TFP, 
Property rights is included among the explanatory variables. Surprisingly, our findings suggest that 
better legal frameworks would rather tend to hamper TFP growth. By Ulubasoglu & 
Doucouliagos (2004), institutions embody rules and organs driving the production climate. Their 
researches conclude that democracy has a positive effect on TFP and human capital. However, a 
negative pattern clearly reappears with capital accumulation or labour force growth (see also 
Przeworski & Limongi, 1993; Isaksson, 2007).  
 
Table 2. Preliminary estimations of TFP with respect to corruption 
   Dependent variable: Total factor productivity (TFP) 
   Fixed 
effects 
IV-2SLS System 
GMM 
System GMM 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Corruption -0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.098*** 
(0.003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
TFPt-1 -- -- 0.926*** 
(0.016) 
0.915*** 
(0.014) 
0.934*** 
(0.011) 
0.917*** 
(0.013) 
Openness -- -- -- 0.081*** 
(0.022) 
0.073*** 
(0.020) 
0.061** 
(0.019) 
Property rights -- -- -- -0.099*** 
(0.018) 
-0.075*** 
(0.015) 
-0.102*** 
(0.016) 
Improved sanitation -- -- -- 0.044*** 
(0.013) 
0.038** 
(0.012) 
0.030** 
(0.009) 
Energy use -- -- -- -0.006 
(0.004) 
-- -- 
Electricity -- -- -- -- 0.0004 
(0.002) 
-- 
Transport service -- -- -- -- -- 0.024 
(0.016) 
Intercept 
 
-- 1.250*** 
(0.022) 
-- -- -- -- 
R-squared 0.018 n.a.a -- -- -- -- 
Sargan test (p-value) -- -- 1 1 1 1 
AR (1) (p-value) -- -- 0.013 0.009 0.024 0.010 
AR (2) (p-value)   0.338 0.811 0.894 0.779 
Wald test, coefficients (p-
value) 
-- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test, dummies (p-
value) 
-- -- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 1088 1088 1984 1877 1606 1828 
Notes. Robust standard errors of System GMM estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,**, and *, represent 
statistical significance at 0.1, 1, and 5 % error level, respectively. 
a: n.a. = not applicable; R-squared is not an appropriate measure of goodness of fit when using the estimator of 2SLS. 
 
 
Furthermore, the variables that the proxy infrastructure factor (Energy use, Electricity, and Transport 
service) do not seem to have significant effect in explaining the dependent variable. Estimated 
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coefficients are overall positive, but seldom statistically significant. For example, Aschauer (1989) 
showed that infrastructures have a high return in terms of private capital productivity. However 
that is possible only when their funding and management are more efficient (Aschauer & Lachler, 
1998). Basing on 46 developing countries with 1970–1990 time span, their data highlight a 
positive effect from infrastructure when financed through lower current government spending, 
on the contrary of a funding causing further increase in public debt. That probably explains our 
results regarding infrastructures. In addition, note that more than 2/3 of countries of our sample 
are developing ones. 
 
Table 3. System GMM estimations of TFP including more control variables 
   Dependent variable: Total factor productivity (TFP)  
   System GMM 
   7 8 9 10 11 12 
Corruption -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
TFPt-1 0.929*** 
(0.013) 
0.921*** 
(0.013) 
0.943*** 
(0.010) 
0.942*** 
(0.010) 
0.935*** 
(0.012) 
0.923*** 
(0.014) 
Openness 0.083*** 
(0.023) 
0.095*** 
(0.028) 
0.076*** 
(0.021) 
0.085*** 
(0.023) 
0.061** 
(0.020) 
0.078** 
(0.025) 
Property rights -0.085*** 
(0.017) 
-0.055** 
(0.019) 
-0.061*** 
(0.015) 
-0.056** 
(0.017) 
-0.083*** 
(0.014) 
-0.063*** 
(0.017) 
Improved sanitation 0.047*** 
(0.013) 
0.043** 
(0.013) 
0.045*** 
(0.013) 
0.042** 
(0.013) 
0.035*** 
(0.010) 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
Energy use 0.006 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
-- -- -- -- 
Government spending -- -0.036** 
(0.011) 
-- -0.022* 
(0.010) 
-- -0.034** 
(0.012) 
Inflation -0.032** 
(0.010) 
-0.043*** 
(0.011) 
-0.037*** 
(0.010) 
-0.044*** 
(0.011) 
-0.033*** 
(0.009) 
-0.045*** 
(0.011) 
Electricity -- -- 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-- -- 
Transport service -- -- -- -- 0.031* 
(0.015) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.011 0.007 0.033 0.020 0.007 0.010 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.858 0.934 0.933 0.951 0.844 0.926 
Wald test, coefficients (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test, dummies (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 1877 1846 1606 1586 1828 1803 
Notes. Robust standard errors of System GMM estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,**, and *, represent 
statistical significance at 0.1, 1, and 5 % error level, respectively. 
 
 
In the end, our findings also confirm the common reasoning regarding the pernicious effect of 
inflation on economic performance (Romer, 1993; Lane, 1997). The estimated coefficients of 
Inflation in Table 2 are constantly negative and highly statistically meaningful, which unequivocally 
points to the decline in TFP. Moreover, corruption has been partly identified as one of the causal 
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chains of high inflation (Al-Marhubi, 2000). Given that corruption at the same time tends to 
increase transaction costs, we then hypothesize that together, they reinforce each other and 
seriously hinder TFP. 
Government spending is also found to reduce TFP. However, this indicator includes the level of 
government consumption and all transfer payments. Such expenditures are not truly productive; 
they are even perceived as responsible to budget deficits and public debt, hence they would 
rather tend to reduce economic dynamism. Moreover, Mauro (1998) finds evidence of the 
influence of corruption in favouring some sectorial budgets more than others. Thus, corruption 
indeed seems to be associated to a fall in expenditures in health, education (ibid., 1998), a fall in 
education, social protection, or health sectors spending (Delavallade, 2006), but to an increase in 
military, energy, or culture, order, or public services spending (ibid., 2006). Dzhumashev (2014) 
empirically shows that expenditures related to social security are positively associated with 
corruption (ibid., 2006).  
 
3.2 The joint influence of corruption and tax burden on TFP 
In Table 4 the focus is on the role played by tax burden in the relationship between corruption 
and TFP. Again the analysis starts with a basic estimation (Regression 13) involving these variables 
of interest only. More specifically, TFP is controlled with respect to TFPt-1, Corruption, Tax burden, 
and Corruption*Tax burden. The estimation results regarding the effect of corruption on TFP are 
robust and also claim that corrupt behaviors are contradictory to the objective of TFP growth. 
As in regressions launched before, the estimated coefficient of Corruption is negative and highly 
statistically significant. Furthermore, that of Tax burden also displays the same characteristics, 
saying that a relatively higher tax burden also likely causes a decline in TFP. However, when one 
considers Corruption*Tax burden, the interaction term between corruption and tax burden, it 
appears that the estimated coefficient is positive with highest statistical significance. The finding 
suggests that tax burden increases the negative impact of corruption on TFP, and vice versa. A 
scrutiny of Regression 3 compared to Regression 13 also gives credit to that argument. The 
difference between both estimations lies in the fact that the first regression ignores the influence 
of taxes on TFP, whereas the second one does not. As mentioned previously, Regression 3 
predicted a 0.005% drop in TFP when corruption level increase of 1-unit. However by including 
tax incidence in Regression 13, the estimated loss TFP provoked by corruption increases of 
0.016%, which corresponds to an increase in its negative spillovers of 160%.  
To put it simply, when the share of taxes in income increases, this is likely to aggravate 
corruption. Taxpayers merely tend to resort more and more to corruption or other fraudulent 
practices leading to tax evasion with its stabilizing effect in response to excessive tax increases. 
The foundations of this theory are in the Leviathan bureaucratic model developed by Buchanan 
& Brennan (1980), Tullock (1959), and Tiebout (1956). Leviathan government, which 
systematically seeks at increasing its size through public expenditures, applies disproportionate 
taxation in order to maximize tax revenue. With such expenditures, the Leviathan government 
intends to reinforce its power and gain in terms of prestige (Buchanan & Brennan, 1980). 
However, mobility and tax evasion considerably alleviate the expenditure-maximizing model 
reducing fiscal revenues. Recent developments in the literature also go in the same direction. 
Sanyal, Gang, & Goswami (2000) find that high tax rates result in smaller net revenue for the 
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government. Furthermore, intensifying public sector audit and fine rate may have perverse 
impacts, thus reducing net revenues. This is even more likely when tax and fine rates are 
positively correlated with corruption (Goerke, 2008; Çule & Fulton, 2009). After testing how the 
incentive of tax officials towards bribery influences firm’s tax evasion, Alm, Martinez-Vasquez, & 
McClennan (2016) conclude in the other way round that corruption is both economically and 
statistically significant in explaining the high levels of tax evasion. Tax evasion results in 
exacerbating corruption by creating additional opportunities for it (ibid., 2016). 
 
Table 4. System GMM estimations of TFP including more control variables: The influence of tax burden 
    Dependent variable: Total factor productivity (TFP)  
    System GMM 
   13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Corruption -0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
TFPt-1 0.951*** 
(0.009) 
0.938*** 
(0.011) 
0.942*** 
(0.010) 
0.945*** 
(0.009) 
0.942*** 
(0.009) 
0.940*** 
(0.010) 
0.948*** 
(0.009) 
Openness -- 0.078*** 
(0.022) 
0.072*** 
(0.019) 
0.077*** 
(0.020) 
0.074*** 
(0.020) 
0.058** 
(0.019) 
0.052** 
(0.018) 
Property rights -- -0.070*** 
(0.017) 
-0.052** 
(0.017) 
-0.040** 
(0.014) 
-0.042** 
(0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.015) 
-0.066*** 
(0.015) 
Improved sanitation -- 0.048*** 
(0.012) 
0.038*** 
(0.011) 
0.033* 
(0.013) 
0.037** 
(0.012) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.029** 
(0.009) 
Energy use -- 0.005 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-- -- -- -- 
Inflation -- -0.040*** 
(0.010) 
-0.035*** 
(0.010) 
-0.049** 
(0.020) 
-0.039*** 
(0.012) 
-0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.036** 
(0.015) 
Tax burden -0.137*** 
(0.041) 
-0.045*** 
(0.016) 
-0.091*** 
(0.029) 
-0.111*** 
(0.038) 
-0.121*** 
(0.040) 
-0.046*** 
(0.015) 
-0.099*** 
(0.034) 
Corruption*Tax burden 0.020*** 
(0.006) 
-- 0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.007) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
-- 0.011** 
(0.005) 
Corruption*Inflation -- -- -- 0.004** 
(0.003) 
-- -- 0.002** 
(0.002) 
Electricity -- -- -- 0.005 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-- -- 
Transport service -- -- -- -- -- 0.030* 
(0.016) 
0.029* 
(0.014) 
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.0045 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.003 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.384 0.867 0.941 0.978 0.993 0.838 0.913 
Wald test, coefficients (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test, dummies (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 1980 1877 1873 1602  1602 1828 1824 
Notes. Robust standard errors of System GMM estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,**, and *, represent statistical 
significance at 0.1, 1, and 5 % error level, respectively. 
 
 
Returning to our model, the paper performs further regressions (Regression 14 to 19). They 
involve the use of several alternative determinants of TFP as control variables to test how robust 
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is the tax burden’s effect on corruption. In all the regression, the estimated coefficients of 
corruption and tax burden rigorously keep their negative sign while being highly significant, 
pointing once again to the detrimental effect of TFP. In particular, the test is further dug with the 
introduction of an additional interaction variable (Corruption*Inflation): that involving corruption 
and inflation. The estimated coefficient of the new interaction term is positive implying, just like 
with tax burden, that inflation to some extent contributes to corruption (Al-Marhubi, 2000). Both 
interaction variables, alongside with several determinants of TFP, are jointly used to control TFP 
in Regressions 16 and 19. Unambiguously, our finding still remains robust. Both Sargan and 
Arellano–Bond tests stay valid confirming the moment’s conditions.  
Furthermore, the paper also considers regional dummy variables in addition to independent 
variables to further extend the robustness test regarding our main findings. These variables are 
generated following the World Economic Outlook database (International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)) categorization. Variables used in the estimations are: Emerging developing Asia; Sub-Saharan 
Africa; Advanced economies; Latin America–Caribbean; Middle-East–North Africa; and Euro area. They 
are tested in Regression 16, which includes at this stage alongside with Regression 19 a higher 
number of explanatory variables. The results of the robustness test are reported in Appendix 
(Table 5, Regression 16.1 to 16.6). We point out that the significance of variables slightly suffers 
because of the new control variables; however findings regarding the effects of corruption and 
tax burden on TFP remain valid; so for tests associated to regressions.  
4. Conclusion 
This study is an empirical analysis that examines the effects of corruption and tax burden on total 
factor productivity (TFP). It makes use of panel data of 90 countries worldwide over with span 
1996-2014, and uses the corruption perception index (CPI) provided by Transparency International. 
The estimation results unambiguously suggest that corruption, like tax burden, has a negative 
effect on TFP. When both variables alongside with the lagged dependent are used for controlling 
TFP, the finding suggests that one-unit increase in corruption standard deviation is associated to 
a decrease of 0.016% in TFP, and the increase in tax burden in the same proportion leads to a 
decline in TFP of 0.137% (Table 4, Regression 13). Furthermore, our findings highlight that a tax 
rate increase would result an aggravation of the negative impact of corruption on TFP. These 
findings remain robust to the introduction of TFP determinant variables over alternative 
regressions.  
All in all, the paper sustains that TFP represents a narrow channel through which corruption 
highly undermines the economic prosperity of countries. To respond to the threat posed by 
corruption for the economies, decision-makers must pay due attention to fiscal policy in its 
design and implementation. The latter is a “double-edged sword” for countries regarding its 
intertwinement with corruption through shadow economy and other illegal practices deriving 
therefrom. Optimal taxation and efficient use of tax revenues both constitute an instrument for 
monitoring corruption efficiently; as such they encourage economic progress. Conversely, their 
mishandling generates more corruption and significantly affects their contribution to the service 
of the community. 
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For future studies, it might be interesting to empirically examine whether the impact of tax rate 
increases on TFP is conditional on how far countries are subject to tax evasion. Furthermore, a 
long-term comparison of the influence of corruption on the twin factors (human-physical capital) 
and TFP would be revealing too. It would help to understand whether the way corruption affects 
the dynamic of the economy changes over time – if so, then in which extent and which are the 
determinants. The implication of such an exercise could be that anticorruption efforts are 
oriented towards sectors on the basis of their sensitivity to corruption.  
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Appendix: 	
Table 5. Robustness test of the influence of corruption and tax burden on TFP 
    Dependent variable: Total factor productivity (TFP)  
    System GMM 
   16 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6  
Corruption -0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
TFPt-1 0.945*** 
(0.009) 
0.932*** 
(0.011) 
0.928*** 
(0.011) 
0.929*** 
(0.010) 
0.924*** 
(0.012) 
0.918*** 
(0.013) 
0.914*** 
(0.013) 
Openness 0.077*** 
(0.020) 
0.091*** 
(0.023) 
0.095*** 
(0.025) 
0.091*** 
(0.024) 
0.097*** 
(0.026) 
0.105*** 
(0.029) 
0.107*** 
(0.028) 
Property rights -0.040** 
(0.014) 
-0.042** 
(0.015) 
-0.045** 
(0.016) 
-0.046** 
(0.016) 
-0.044* 
(0.017) 
-0.046** 
(0.016) 
-0.047** 
(0.016) 
Improved sanitation 0.033* 
(0.013) 
0.038** 
(0.014) 
0.046*** 
(0.014) 
0.042** 
(0.014) 
0.038** 
(0.013) 
0.041** 
(0.013) 
0.043** 
(0.013) 
Inflation -0.049** 
(0.020) 
-0.045* 
(0.020) 
-0.041* 
(0.019) 
-0.046* 
(0.020) 
-0.048* 
(0.026) 
-0.049* 
(0.021) 
-0.047* 
(0.022) 
Tax burden -0.111*** 
(0.038) 
-0.123*** 
(0.041) 
-0.119*** 
(0.039) 
-0.112** 
(0.042) 
-0.114** 
(0.043) 
-0.117** 
(0.042) 
-0.118** 
(0.043) 
Corruption*Tax burden 0.015*** 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
Corruption*Inflation 0.004** 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Electricity 0.005 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Emerging developing Asia -- -0.022*** 
(0.006) 
-0.020** 
(0.006) 
-0.018** 
(0.006) 
-0.026* 
(0.010) 
-0.017 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -- -- 0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.010) 
Advanced economies -- -- -- 0.010 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
Latin America – Caribbean -- -- -- -- -0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.0004 
(0.008) 
0.0003 
(0.008) 
Middle-East – North Africa -- -- -- -- -- 0.019 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.012) 
Euro area -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.003 
(0.006) 
Sargan test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (1) (p-value) 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.012 
AR (2) (p-value) 0.978 0.994 0.988 0.999 0.989 0.978 0.976 
Wald test, coefficients (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test, dummies (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 1602  1602 1602 1602 1602 1602 1602 
Notes. Robust standard errors of System GMM estimator are in parentheses. The superscripts ***,**, and *, represent statistical 
significance at 0.1, 1, and 5 % error level, respectively. 
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Figure 1.1. TFP vs Corruption: Emerging Developing Asia (EDA)
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Figure 1.2. TFP vs Corruption: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
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Figure 1.3. TFP vs Corruption: Advanced economies (AE)
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Figure 1.4. TFP vs Corruption: Latin America - Caribbean (LAC)
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Figure 1.5. TFP vs Corruption: Middle-East - North Africa (MENA)
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Figure 1.6. TFP vs Corruption: Euro area (EA)
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Figure 1.7. TFP vs Corruption: Emerg. market and developing economies
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Figure 1.8. TFP vs Corruption: OECD
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Table 6. Unit-root test, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (AD-F) and Phillips-Perron (P-P) methods 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Variable DF statistics p-value DF statistics p-value 
TFP -9.846 < 0.01 -31.332 0.01 
Corruption -10.778 < 0.01 -32.583 0.01 
Openness -10.035 < 0.01 -31.959 0.01 
Property rights -9.953 < 0.01 -31.645 0.01 
Inflation -10.821 < 0.01 -31.664 0.01 
Tax burden -10.104 < 0.01 -30.934 0.01 
Government spending -9.720 < 0.01 -29.000 0.01 
Health expenditure -10.977 < 0.01 -32.182 0.01 
Improved sanitation -10.886 < 0.01 -31.853 0.01 
Electricity -9.306 < 0.01 -30.809 0.01 
Transport service -10.045 < 0.01 -32.198 0.01 
Energy use -9.249 < 0.01 -30.904 0.01 
Notes. For both methods, the null hypothesis (H0) is that the series contain a unit root, against an 
alternative hypothesis (H1) that at least one panel is stationary. H0 is rejected under the condition 
that the p-value associated to DF statistics is smaller than the critical value 0.05. Here, in both 
cases, all series are rigorously stationary.  
 
 
 
Table 7. List of countries (90) in the sample 
Argentina,	 Australia,	 Austria,	 Bahrain, Barbados,	 Belgium,	 Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria,	Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic,	Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus,	 Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South 
Africa,	 Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
